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THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF WATER TRANSFERS AND 
THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
 
Charles W. Howe* 
 
The General Desirability of Water Transfers 
 
Flexibility in the allocative pattern of any 
scarce resource is highly desirable from the point 
of view of economic efficiency. The resource can 
move from lower valued uses to emerging higher 
valued uses that result from demographic, 
economic, and public value changes. Naturally it 
is desirable that this flexibility be accompanied by 
security of tenure for those holding the resource so 
that longer term investments will not be 
endangered. These two attributes make water 
markets attractive as vehicles for effecting water 
transfers (Howe, et al, 1986). 
 
The increasing economic and environmental 
costs of new water supplies reinforce the 
increasing popularity of water transfers (e.g. 
Frederick, 1986; Howe and Easter, 1971). The 
largest pool of water available for transfer is found 
in irrigated agriculture where about 80% of 
consumptive use in the western United States 
takes place (U.S.G.S., 1988). 
 
The agricultural sector is currently under 
increasing pressure from international competition 
and increasing domestic resistance to farm price 
support programs. The outlook is for a continued 
fall in real prices for major agricultural 
commodities on world markets (Young, et al, 
1988). Thus one would expect reallocations from 
agriculture to emerging non-agricultural uses, 
especially urban and industrial uses, provide the 






The Nature of Agricultural to Non-
Agricultural Water Transfers 
 
The economists’ models of efficient 
competitive markets, if applied to water resources, 
would picture a smooth, relatively low-cost 
process of moving water from the lowest-value 
applications in agriculture to growing non-
agricultural uses. Naturally, no one expects the 
process to work perfectly since water markets 
suffer from lack of information, heterogeneity of 
water itself (by location, seniority, quality, etc.), 
and possibly high transactions costs. 
 
Some models of the transfer process, 
especially those of the linear-programming 
variety, overlook some of the realities of water as 
a tradable resource and thus may produce some 
misleading predictions (e.g. Mann, Sparling, and 
Young, 1987; Howe and Ahrens, 1988). 
 
A study currently underway in Colorado 
(U.S.G.S. grant through the Colorado Water 
Resources Research Institute to the Natural 
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, 
1987) has investigated 743 completed transfers for 
which application was made in the decade 1976-
84. These transfers exhibited the following 
characteristic: 
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agric. to agric.:  146 
agric. to non-ag.:  531 
non-ag. to non-ag.   66 
1 cu. ft./sec. or less:  3301 
greater than 1 cfs.:  216 
100 acre-feet or less:  148 
greater than 100 af:   48 
1  Under the Colorado system of water administration, water 
rights and their transfers are often characterized by a flow rate 
only. Storage rights and some flow rights are volumetrically 
quantified. 
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Thus what we observe is a large number of 
small water transfers accompanied by a few 
more eye-catching large transfers, dominated 
by agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Many 
of these are irrigation to stock-watering and 
rural domestic uses or transfers to small rural 
subdivisions. The public’s awareness of 
transfers is limited to the large ones such as 
the transfer of 40,000 acre-feet of Colorado 
Canal Water (Arkansas River Valley) to the 
City of Colorado Springs or the still-to-be 
effected transfer of 52% of the Rocky Ford 
Ditch (9,300 a.f.) to the City of Aurora. 
 
While the small water transfers appear to 
conform to the economists’ model of a 
smoothly operating water market, the large 
transfers certainly do not: they involve large 
volumes of water from a single location; they 
typically involve very senior (reliable) water 
rights; and they frequently represent water that 
has been applied to the better soils, growing at 
least some valuable crops. What is wrong with 
the model? 
 
The need for urban areas and industry to 
obtain reliable water every few years is not 
attractive to urban users. These senior rights 
were (by definition) developed early and 
typically applied to the best bottom lands as 
regional development progressed. Naturally, 
the fact that these rights are transferred out of 
agriculture doesn’t necessarily imply that the 
crops they irrigated will stop being produced. 
It is likely (and evidence to date indicates) that 
high-valued crops that are market-limited in 
quantity, will be picked up by other farmers in 
the area. The crops that are forfeited are 
generally forage crops, small grains, and 
irrigated pasture. 
 
The large volume of water involved in 
these big transfers at first glance appears to be 
explainable by economies of scale, both in 
physical transfer systems and in transaction 
costs. Some transfers require the construction 
of pipelines, tunnels, or canals--structures that 
exhibit great economies of scale in 
construction costs. If a city proposes to 
transfer some water, why not a large volume 
that will reduce the unit costs of physical 
transfer. 
 
The issue of transaction costs is not so 
simple. These costs include search costs for a 
buyer or seller; application costs to the court or 
state engineer; costs of hydrologic, 
engineering, and agronomic studies; court 
costs; and costs of countering or meeting 
objections to the transfer. At first glance, it 
would appear that these costs also would 
exhibit substantial economies of scale, i.e. that 
some of them would be fixed or at best would 
increase less than in proportion to the size of 
the transfer.. Preliminary analysis of Colorado 
data indicates that, while this is true for some 
of the minor cost items, the costs occasioned 
by opposition to the transfer increase rapidly 
as the size of transfer increases (Boggs, 
unpublished). Every sizeable transfer has 
opponents, sometimes dozens. Large water 
rights owners (cities and ditch companies) 
frequently retain counsel to oppose every 
proposed transfer as a matter of course. Thus, 
there appear to be (at least under the Colorado 
system) substantial diseconomies of scale in 
transaction costs. 
 
Impacts of Water Transfers 
 
If all water transfers were economically 
efficient from, say, a state accounting stance, 
then state income would increase as a result of 
the transfer--at least in a present value sense. 
Can we expect transfers to be efficient? There 
are several reasons to expect at least some 
transfers to be inefficient from state or national 
accounting stances. First, certain important 
public values are not protected by 
administrative criteria in the approval process. 
Especially water quality, instream values, fish 
and wildlife, and other recreational values are 
variously omitted from state criteria. Of 
course, there could be net increases in these 
values as well as decreases, but frequently no 
protection is provided, so these values are 
likely to be ignored by the transferors of water. 
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Secondly, cities frequently accumulate water 
supplies far in excess of current needs, either in 
anticipation of future growth or to have “super 
safe” systems. While some of this excess water 
may be leased back to the agricultural sector until 
it is needed, a higher level of risk is introduced 
for the user, precluding higher valued uses. Since 
urban water costs are frequently hidden from 
urban water users (because of inappropriate 
pricing), urban managers adopt an excessively 
risk-averse attitude, making the accumulation of 
raw water supplies excessively large. 
 
Even if water transfers are economically 
efficient from state or national points of view, 
there is no guarantee--indeed little likelihood--
that the area or basin of origin will gain from the 
transfer. Most transfers are out of the basin of 
origin, so the benefits to the new user do not 
accrue to the basin of origin. Since many of the 
basins of origin are depressed or declining 
regions to begin with, the likelihood that the 
proceeds from the sale of water will be reinvested 
in that basin is small. Thus the phasing-out of 
agriculture will be accompanied by various 
negative local multiplier effects (forward or 
backward linkages) that are unlikely to be offset 
by new activities. Finally, the environmental 
effects on the basin of origin are almost always 
negative. 
 
Institutional Reforms Needed to Maximize Net 
Benefits from Transfers 
 
It should be clear from the discussion above 
that unfettered free market transfers are unlikely 
to be economically efficient. What is needed is 
the protection of or accounting for public values 
that are not taken into account by buyers and 
sellers nor, in some states, incorporated in the 
water law. Since appropriations doctrine 
everywhere protects other water diverters, what is 
needed is an expansion of state water laws to 
recognize and protect the wider set of instream, 
recreational, and aesthetic values. The states of 
Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico have 
incorporated in their water law such criteria as 
non-degradation of water quality, protection of 
fish and wildlife, and even (Idaho) impacts on the 
local economy and on family farming. The 
“public trust doctrine” that has been invoked in 
California in the Mono Lake case serves to 
protect an undefined set of public values--
probably not a desirable policy development 
because of the uncertainty of the criteria being 
used. 
 
Governance structures for irrigation and 
conservancy districts that are more representative 
of the populations affected by water systems 
would help in the introduction of broader social 
values in water management. Many irrigation or 
conservancy districts today incorporate towns 
and industries, yet continue to be governed by 
“old water boy” groups that have too little 
appreciation of the changing values of water to 
society. These districts often have excellent 
technical management and do what they do very 
well; it’s just that they are doing, in part, the 
wrong things. 
 
Included among the issues is the need to 
make district boundaries and allowable water 
uses flexible. Districts typically distribute project 
water within specified boundaries that had 
significance historically but that grow out of 
date. Failure to allow water to be sold outside 
historical boundaries can introduce substantial 
inefficiencies in water allocation. An example is 
found in the contrasting water prices found in the 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District--
about $1,000 per acre-foot in perpetuity--and 
prices for comparable non-project water in the 
northern Denver suburban area--up to $4,500 per 
acre-foot. While the Northern District’s 
management feels an obligation to keep 
Colorado-Big Thompson project water in the 
District, the farmers who still own most of the 
water see their water wealth diminished by a 
factor of 3 or 4, while Denver suburbs pay 
unnecessarily high prices for water or are backed 
into supporting unneeded new projects like the 
Two Forks Dam. 
 
Other small federal and state policy 
changes could greatly facilitate socially 
responsible water transfers. Federal projects, 
originally authorized 
 19 
by Congress for certain water uses only, 
should be freed up to serve any beneficial 
purposes able to buy the water and to repay 
federal cost obligations. States could 
streamline the administrative or court 
processes by which transfers are reviewed and 
approved (or modified) by using standard 
guidelines (e.g. for computing historical 
consumptive uses), by keeping better water 
rights and transfer records (today only a 
specialist lawyer or engineer dare venture a 
guess about the real nature of a water right), 
and by providing information on stream flows 
and storage that will help bring buyers and 
sellers together. 
 
Water transfers are clearly destined to 
play an expanding role in the future. No major 
region of the country need fear water shortage 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER MARKETING AND 
WATER TRANSFERS 
 
Lawrence J. MacDonnell* 
 
 
Most of the West’s renewable water 
resources are already appropriated and 
developed. Opportunities for additional 
development are limited by a number of 
factors. At the same time, demands for water 
in the West are undergoing major and lasting 
changes. Irrigated agriculture, long the 
dominant user of water in the West, is 
declining in relative economic importance. 
New consumptive demands now derive 
largely from urban growth. There is also a 
growing demand for “instream” uses of water. 
These conditions suggest the need for 
reallocation of a portion of developed water 
supplies to these new, higher value demands. 
 
Western Water Rights 
 
Rights to use western water resources 
exist in a variety of forms. Appropriative 
water rights may provide either direct flows of 
water or storage rights. In many cases, rights 
to use ditch water or water in a reservoir are 
based on ownership shares. Water may be 
supplied for use on the basis of a contract. 
Rights to use water may derive from land 
ownership as, for example, with groundwater 
in some states. Reallocation occurs when any 
existing use or right to use is changed or 
transferred to a new use. The term “water 
marketing” applies to the lease or sale of any 
such right. Widespread attention in recent 
years has been focused on water marketing as 
a 
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